



OF BROADCASTING STATIONT HELD To HAVE STANDING To PROTEST
FCC LIcENsE RENEWAL
Following the Federal Communications Commission's grant without
hearing of National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) applications for re-
newal of the licenses of stations WRCV and WRCV-TV in Philadelphia,
Philco Corporation filed with the Commission a protest under section
309(c) of the Federal Communications Act, which section provides that,
in case of a grant of authorization without hearing, "any party in interest"
may by timely protest require the Commission to hold a hearing upon
issues relating to matters specified in the protest as grounds for setting
aside the grant.' Philco's claim to be a party in interest was based upon
allegations that the licensee, NBC, was wholly owned by Radio Corporation
of America (RCA), with whom Philco was in competition in the manu-
facture and sale of radio and electronic equipment, and that RCA had been
receiving specified advertising advantages 2 from NBC over the stations
1. "When any instrument of authorization is granted by the Commission without
a hearing . . . , such grant shall remain subject to protest as hereinafter provided
for a period of thirty days. During such thirty-day period any party in interest may
file a protest under oath directed to such grant and request a hearing on said appli-
cation so granted. Any protest so filed . . . shall contain such allegations of fact
as will show the protestant to be a party in interest, and shall specify with particularity
the facts relied upon by the protestant as showing that the grant was improperly made
or would otherwise not be in the public interest. The Commission shall . . . render
a decision making findings as to the sufficiency of the protest in meeting the above
requirements; and, where it so finds, shall designate the application for hearing upon
issues relating to all matters specified in the protest as grounds for setting aside the
grant . . . ." Communications Act, § 309(c), 70 Stat. 3 (1956), 47 U.S.C. § 309(c)
(Supp. V, 1958).
2. It was alleged that NBC-owned stations inserted the phrase "a service of
RCA" during station identification breaks, broadcast news accounts of RCA activity
unjustified by any news value, announced on color television programs that RCA is
the pioneer of color TV, advertised the point of origin of shows originating in the
RCA Exhibition Hall, where RCA products are on display, and incorporated the
letter c6mbinations "RCA" or "RC" into their call letters. Philco also argued that
it had been injured in its capacity as an advertiser by NBC's "option time" and
"must buy" practices, regarding which see Celler, Antitrust Problems in the Television
Broadcasting Industry, 22 LAWS & Con'zMP. PRoD. 549, 560-65 (1957); Salant,
Fisher & Brooks, The Functions and Practices of a Television Network, 22 LAW &
CONTEMIP. PRoD. 584, 599-609 (1957); Barrow, Network Broadcasting-The Report
of the FCC Network Study Staff, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 611, 617-20 (1957).
The court did not consider these latter allegations, but rested its decision squarely on
competitive injury said to derive from the alleged preferential advertising practices.
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relicensed. From the Commission's dismissal of the protest on grounds
that Philco lacked standing as a party in interest under section 309(c),
appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Reversing the Commission's ruling, the court held that the alleged enhance-
ment of RCA's competitive position as against Philco by means of the
advertising practices of RCA's wholly owned subsidiary constituted such
"direct economic effect" on Philco as would give Philco standing to protest.3
Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 27
U.S.L. WEEx 3215 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1959).
The original Communications Act of 1934 made no provision for third-
party intervention or protest in FCC examination of license applications,
4
although a right of appeal from FCC license rulings to the circuit court of
appeals was given any "person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely
affected by any decision of the Commission." 5 The definitive interpreta-
tion of the appeals provision was provided by the Supreme Court in FCC
v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,6 holding that an existing radio station had
standing to appeal an FCC grant of a license to a new station which would
compete with the old; "one likely to be financially injured by the issue of a
license" was held a party aggrieved within the meaning of the act.7 The
Commission's own practice on intervention in license hearings was at first
very liberal but, soon finding that the "major functions served by inter-
venors were apparently to impede the progress of the hearing, to increase
the size of the record and to obfuscate the issues by prolonged and con-
fusing cross-examination," 8 the Commission came by 1939 to more tightly
restrict third-party participation.9 In 1943 the Supreme Court had oppor-
tunity to review one instance of the FCC's new intervention policy. In
FCC v. NBC (KOA) '0 an existing radio station petitioned to intervene
in hearings regarding the grant of a new license, alleging that it would be
subject to severe electrical interference by the new licensee. The FCC
permitted the station to file briefs and present oral argument amicus curiae
3. "We should suppose, to illustrate by an analogy, that if a department store
operated television and radio stations so as to obtain substantial preferential adver-
tising advantages over a like store in the community, this competitor would be a
party in interest who could protest renewal of the licenses .... ".Instant case at
659. One judge dissented.
4. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 309, 48 Stat. 1085. See Oberst, Parties
to Administrative Proceedings, 40 Micn. L. Rrv. 378, 388 (1942). Under the 1934
act, procedural problems were in general left to the Commission's own regulation.
See Wall & Jacob, Communications Act Amendments, 1952-Clarity or Ambiguity,
41 GEo. L.J. 135, 138 (1953).
5. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 402(b), 48 Stat. 1093. The appeals
section is preserved as § 402(6) (b), 66 Stat. 718-19, 47 U.S.C. §402(6) (b) (1952).
6. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
7. 309 U.S. at 477.
8. Cited in Oberst, supra note 4, at 389.
9. Id. at 389-90.
10. 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
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but denied full intervenor's participation. Overturning the Commission's
order, the Court held that such a showing of electrical interference as in
fact worked a modification of the original station's original license gave
that station standing to intervene fully as of right in FCC hearings." In
its extensive 1952 amendments to the Communications Act .2 Congress
added sections 309(b) '3 and 309(c), 14 intended to "provide a method
whereby any person, who has the right to challenge the legality or propriety
of . . . a grant by appeal from the Commission's decision, can make
his complaint first before the Commission." x5 These sections, permitting
any "party in interest" to intervene as of right in Commission hearings 16
or, in case of grants without hearing, to protest and require a hearing,'
7
were strenuously opposed by the FCC as "extensively increasing the Com-
mission's workload" 18 and tending "to delay all grants of radio and tele-
vision applications." 'I To assuage Commission fears that the amendments
would permit "intervention into proceedings by a host of parties who have
no legitimate interest but solely with the purpose of delaying license
grants . . ," 20 the Senate committee report, inserted into the Congres-
11. The court rested its decision upon application of §312(b), providing that
"no . . . order of modification shall become final until the holder of such outstand-
ing license or permit shall have been notified in writing of the proposed action and
the grounds or reasons therefor and shall have been given a reasonable opportunity
to show cause why an order of modification should not issue." Communications Act
of 1934, ch. 652, §312(b), 48 Stat. 1087 (now 66 Stat 717, 47 U.S.C. §316(a)
(1952)).
12. See generally Fisher, Communications Act Amendments, 1952-An Attempt
to Legislate Administrative Fairness, 22 LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 672 (1957); Wall
& Jacob, supra note 4.
13. 66 Stat. 715, 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1952). On a balance of practicalities, quite
different tests should perhaps apply to determine, on the one hand, standing to
intervene in a hearing already opened and prosecuted by the FCC itself and, on the
other, standing to protest an authorization granted without hearing. The function
of the intervenor is to provide further informational support for the Commission's
own resistance of the license; the protestant, in addition, has the provocative function
of forcing the Commission to examine critically the qualifications of an applicant
who has already been granted a license without Commission objection. Congress
has chosen, however, to make identical the qualifications for standing in the two
cases: equivalent phrases, "party in interest"-"parties in interest," are used in the
two sections, and the Senate report defines the two together. S. REP. No. 44, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 8, 97 CoNG. REc. 965, 967 (1951). See Fisher, supra note 12, at
692. Subsequent discussion in this Comment will use the term "intervention" to
describe all third-party participation.
14. 66 Stat. 715 (1952), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (Supp. V, 1958).
15. S. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 8, 97 CONG. REc. 965, 967 (1951).
16. Section 309(b), 66 Stat. 715, 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1952).
17. Section 309(c), 66 Stat 715 (1952), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (Supp. V,
1958). See note 1 supra.
18. Hearings on S. 658 Before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1951).
19. 98 CONG. REc. 7393 (1952) (statement of Representative Harris). See also
Hearings on S. 658, supra note 18, at 305. And see 21 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 368, 370
(1953).
20. S. REP. No. 44, supra note 15, § 8, 97 CoNG. REc. at 967; see Note, 55 CoLum.
L. REv. 209, 211-12 (1955).
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sional Record, expressed the clear intent that "party in interest" be limited
to the two classes of persons "defined by the Supreme Court decision in
the KOA case . . . and . . . the Sanders case." 21 Subsequent Com-
mission decisions in fact have applied the KOA and Sanders tests to deter-
mine the question of standing.2 In this, the scope of the economic or
competitive injury doctrine has proved the most contentious problem. After
initial hesitationn2 the Commission extended the Sanders rule to include
protestants in other communications media: a radio station was permitted
to protest the grant of a television license ;24 finally a newspaper was held
a party in interest to protest under section 309(c).2 But it is significant
that the injury which gives standing to protest has been restricted by the
Commission to injury arising from direct competition within the com-
munications field itself; collateral competitive advantage to a rival in another
sphere of activity has been held insufficient. Thus, the FCC denied to a
taxicab company standing to protest the issuance to a competing cab com-
pany of an auxiliary station license which would permit central radio com-
munication with a cruising fleet.26 Even within the Sanders framework,
however, the "undue amount of Commission time" 27 consumed by hearings
on the protest of competitors soon brought section 309(c) under fire again.
In 1955 the Commission urged legislative amendment which would permit
FCC disposal of some protests without full hearing by procedure analogous
to demurrer, would allow the Commission to redraft issues tendered for
hearing by a protestant, and would grant wide FCC power to continue in
effect the grant protested during protest hearings. 28  This last provision
was intended to discourage the large number of protests which the Com-
mission felt were being filed merely for delay 29 and which, under 1952 law,
operated except in specified cases automatically to postpone the initial Com-
21. S. RPa. No. 44, supra note 15, § 8, 97 CONG. Rxc. at 967.
22. Cases cited in 21 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 368, 369 (1953). See Huntley, Grow-
ing Pains in Broadcast Regulation, 14 WASHr. & LEE L. Rav. 186, 209-18 (1957);
Note, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 209 (1955).
23. See Versluis Radio & Television, 9 P & F RADIO RFas. 102, 104 (1953).
24. Ibid.
25. Ohio Valley Broadcasting Corp., 10 P & F RADIo REGS. 452 (1954), 102
U. PA. L. Rwv. 1080 (1954) ; see Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d '11
(D.C. Cir. 1955).
26. Yellowcab Co., 9 P & F RADIO REas. 122 (1953). It should be noted that
the license here involved is an auxiliary license, which might well involve different
considerations in determining "party in interest."
27. Hearings on S. 1648 Before a Subcmnmittee of Senate Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1955) (separate views of Commissioner
Doerfer).
28. See generally Hearings on S. 1648, supra note 27. See also 25 FoaDHAm L.
RE~v. 777 (1957). Fisher takes the view that the 1956 amendments have been inade-
quate to remedy the failings of § 309(c). Fisher, supra note 12, at 690-91.
29. See Hearings on S. 1648, supra note 27, at 24; 101 CoNG. Rac. 11153-54
(1955) (statement of Representative Harris).
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mission grant under protest.8 0 In committee hearings it was apparent that
a majority of the Commission favored outright repeal of section 309(c) 81
which three years experience had confirmed to be "both undesirable and
unnecessary," 32 but, failing repeal, the Commission supported amendment.
In 1956 the amendment proposed by the Commission was enacted as the
current section 309(c). It may be noted that although the Commission, in
committee hearings, typified the construction to date of "party in interest"
as "awfully broad" 3 and cast upon this broad interpretation major respon-
sibility for the ill effects of the protest procedure,84 none of the illustrative
examples offered in the hearings extended the Sanders principle to com-
petitive injury in fields beyond communications itself.35
Thus, although the legislative history of section 309(c) reveals no
touchstone of congressional intent determinative of the instant case,3 6 it
does point up considerations central to a proper evaluation of the issues
posed. In general, there are two distinct grounds which may support third-
party participation in administrative licensing procedures. The first is that
the would-be intervenor himself represents some particular legitimate in-
terest involved.3 Specifically, as regards the Federal Communications Act,
this is the KOA case; the existing radio station has an interest in non-
interference which Congress has by the act expressly intended to protect.88
30. "[P]ending hearing and decision the effective date of the Commission's
action to which protest is made shall be postponed to the effective date of the Com-
mission's decision after hearing, unless the authorization involved is necessary to
the maintenance or conduct of an existing service .... " Communications Act,
ch. 879, § 7, 66 Stat. 716 (1952).
31. Hearings on S. 1648, supra note 27, at 24; see statement of Commissioner
Doerfer, id. at 44-54.
32. Id. at 24.
33. Id. at 40 (testimony of counsel for the Commission) ; see also id. at 25.
34. Id. at 11.
35. See id. at 40; 101 CONG. REc. 11153-54 (1955).
36. Whatever argument may be made from legislative history in this case seems
to weigh against recognition of Philco as a party in interest. The emphasis of the
original 1952 Senate report was upon limiting the term to the Sanders holding, not
extending it to a class of cases of which Sanders could be considered merely exemplary.
See text accompanying notes 18, 19 supra. The 1956 amendment reenacting the
"party in interest" phraseology postdated the Commission s taking a restrictive view
of competitive injury in Yellowcab Co., 9 P & F RADIo REas. 122 (1953), although
this particular aspect of Commission interpretation was not specifically brought to
the attention of the legislators. See also text accompanying note 33 supra.
37. Davis, Standing To Challenge and To Enforce Administrative Action, 49
CoLum. L. REv. 759, 791-92 (1949) ; Note, 52 YALE L.J. 671, 674 (1943). See Byse,
Opportunity To Be Heard in License Issuance, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 57, 87-99 (1952);
Oberst, supra note 4, at 386.
38. A primary purpose of communications regulation is to protect against mutual
electrical interference, to keep "broadcasters out of each other's 'hair in the air."
Hearings on S. 1648, supra note 27, at 51 (statement of Commissioner Doerfer).
See ZOLLMAN, LAw OF THE AmR §§ 165, 166. 169 (1927) ; Davis, The Radio Act of
1927, 13 VA. L. REv. 611 (1927) ; Huntley, supra note 22, at 187; Note, 36 VA. L. REV.
232, 235-36 (1950); 27 CoLum. L. REv. 726, 727 (1927); cf. Communications Act,
§303(f), 48 Stat 1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §303(f) (1952). See also
19591
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The second is that, although the intervenor himself has no special interest
which the administrative agency is authorized to consider as substantive
grounds for refusing a license, that competitive interest which he does have
as against the applicant makes him a useful instrument for bringing to the
attention of the agency all those facts and arguments which oppose the
grant.39 This second role of the intervenor, as "private attorney general," 40
is that of economically injured competitors before the FCC. In Sanders the
Supreme Court clearly held that economic injury to an existing station is
no cause for FCC refusal of a new license.41 The interest which the inter-
venor argues before the Commission is not his own, but the public interest.
2
His standing, which one commentator has labeled a "remedy without a
right," 4 derives from congressional opinion that some party with a large
economic stake in the proceedings is likely to be helpful in getting before
the FCC the mass of evidentiary facts necessary to its decision.44 But in
such a case the question of standing should involve no issue of the relative
equities as among various classes of potential intervenors; to permit inter-
vention to one group and yet deny it to another group having as substantial
an economic interest is neither illogical nor unfair. The legislative purpose
is served if any one motivated party appears. Multiplication of intervenors
may add nothing; it will certainly consume time. The question resolves
itself into a sheer pragmatic balance between the benefit of having any
given party appear to present evidence and cross-examine for the guidance
of the Commission, and the cost in time and Commission effort which his
appearance will entail.45 To this balance it is relevant that the FCC itself
has found that "some of these hearings have accomplished no useful
purpose" 46 while involving "considerable time and effort on the part of
WARNER, RADIO AND TE LEVIsoN LAw 766 n.25 (1948). Although no licensee has any
property right in his allocated frequency, Communications Act, § 304, 48 Stat. 1083
(1934), 47 U.S.C. § 304 (1952) ; see Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327,
331 (1945) (dictum), the right of a licensee to hearing before modification of his
license is specifically granted by the act. See note 11 supra.
39. Davis, supra note 37, at 792; Note, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 209, 212-13 (1955);
102 U. PA. L. Rmv. 1080, 1082 (1954). See Davis, The Requirement of Opportunity
To Be Heard in the Administrative Process, 51 YALE L.J. 1093 (1942).
40. Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). The term is
extensively used to describe § 309(c) protestants. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1648,
supra note 27, at 26, 52. Compare Commissioner Doerfer's more colorful term
"official kibitzer." Id. at 7.
41. "Plainly it is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee against com-
petition but to protect the public." 309 U.S. at 475.
42. Scripps-hIoward Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (dictum);
Davis, Standing To Challenge and To Enforce Administrative Action, 49 COLUm.
L. REv. 759, 778-80 (1949) ; Fisher, supra note 12, at 682. For consideration of the
substantive question of injury to the public by means of the destruction of competitors,
see Note, 67 YALE L.J. 135 (1957).
43. Davis, Standing To Challenge and To Enforce Administrative Action, 49
CoLuM. L. REv. 759, 780 (1949).
44. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940).
45. See Davis, Standing To Challenge and To Enforce Administrative Action,
49 CoLum. L. Rav. 759, 770 (1949) ; Note, 102 U. PA. L. R-v. 1080, 1082 (1954).
46. Hearings on S. 1648, supra note 27, at 24 (statement of FCC chairman).
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the Commission's limited staff." 4 In fact, the Commission's current work-
load is "tremendous," 48 and the protest hearings seem to constitute a
significant portion of its burden.49 Relevant also is the internal structure
of the FCC with its complete separation of prosecutorial and adjudicative
staffs,50 a separation which, on the one hand, assures a specialized task
force designed to oppose Commission grants, and, on the other, still more
severely limits the Commission's judicial manpower.5 1 It should be noted
that the FCC provides for other effective means of third-party participation
less time-consuming than full party-status intervention: any person may
submit for FCC consideration information bearing upon a given applicant's
fitness for license.5 2 To refuse intervention as of right, moreover, is not
to deprive the Commission of power to permit intervention when in its dis-
cretion intervention appears appropriate.P In addition two considerations
peculiar to the instant case should be observed. The holding that some-
but, as the court specifically points out, not all-persons engaged in com-
petition against licensees in fields other than communications have standing
to protest 5 4 replaces a rather clear category line by a more hazy one. In
47. Ibid. Byse argues that the judgment of an administrative agency, itself best
aware of the adequacy of its investigative staff for the particular fact-finding jobs
before it, should be given great weight on the question of third-party participation
before it. Byse, supra note 37, at 90. Cf. Davis, Standing To Challenge and To
Enforce Adininistrative Action, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 759, 794 (1949).
48. Fisher, supra note 12, at 677.
49. Commissioner Doerfer estimates that protest measures consume 28% of the
Commissioners' time. Hearings on S. 1648, supra note 27, at 52-53. See also Fisher,
supra note 12, at 675. Methods of expediting FCC hearings have been suggested,
Schilz, New Techniques for Expediting Hearings in FCC Proceedings, 55 CoLuM.
L. REv. 830 (1955), but in view of the immense scope of fact inquiry in FCC licensing
cases, id. at 843-44, even the irreducible minimum of time cost is substantial. The
new demurrer procedure, see text accompanying note 28 supra, is of doubtful efficacy
to restrain the persistent protestant, inasmuch as a skillful pleader can usually plead
nondemurrable facts. See Hearings On S. 1648, supra note 27, at 52, 57, 72. For a
wholesale deprecation of § 309(c), see Fisher, supra note 12.
50. Communications Act, § 155(c), 66 Stat 713, 47 U.S.C. § 155(c) (1952).
See Wall & Jacob, supra note 4, at 154-65; Note, 23 U. CINC. L. REv. 469, 474-77
(1954).
51. See Fisher, supra note 12, at 673, 676-80.
52. Under 47 C.F.R. § 1.105 (1958) any "person," notwithstanding his lack of
"sufficient interest to justify his intervention as a party," may be notified of, and give
testimony at FCC hearings. Under 47 C.F.R. § 1.361(c) (1958) "any person" may
object before Commission action to a grant without hearing. ,
53. "[H]earing should not be compulsory in every instance. It should be dis-
cretionary. It is unthinkable that the Commission would deny an evidentiary hearing
to any party making a serious allegation of a grave mistake detrimental to the public
interest . . . ." Hearings on S. 1648, supra note 27, at 52 (statement of Com-
missioner Doerfer). See note 52 supra. See also Fisher, supra note 12, at 691.
Once a protestant establishes his qualifications under §309(c), of course, he may
intervene as of right even though his participation is unhelpful. Elm City Broad-
casting Corp. v. United States, 235 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (arising under § 309(b)).
54. Instant case at 659: "[T]he standing here is to protest only with respect to
renewal of a license of a station wholly owned or controlled by the competitor, which
would not often be the case. We leave other situations for other cases." It is diffi-
cult to see why "whole" control should be necessary so long as control is "whole"
enough to influence policy. Would network affiliation be sufficient? The majority
1959]
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this problem of standing, where it is less important that any individual
protestant be given the right than that the system as a whole function effi-
ciently and without waste effort, any expansion of the number of groups
qualified which will require further appeals and further judicial decision to
clarify the standing question should be regarded with at least initial distrust.
It might be noted also that under this holding any manufacturer of electronic
equipment in competition with RCA may protest each relicensing of each
of NBC's radio or television stations. Such a right not only makes pos-
sible a battery of potential protests which alone may swamp the FCC,55
but puts in the hands of RCA competitors a powerful instrument of
harassment 56 To be balanced against all these considerations there is, of
course, the advantage to be gained from the adversary efforts of such
second-sphere competitors, particularly in regions where competition within
the communications field itself is not intense. The most persuasive argu-
ment for permitting intervention by parties in the position of Philco is that
such parties may be particularly suited to reveal certain kinds of informa-
tion bearing upon an applicant's qualifications which would be less acces-
sible to primary competitors. One would expect, in the case of advertising
preferences or unfair advertising policies, for example, that advertisers
would be both more sensitive to an applicant station's practices and more
willing to disclose them than would competing stations, perhaps themselves
engaged in similar practices, and certainly little inclined to promote more
attractive advertising facilities in a rival's broadcasting schedule. But such
an argument militates for the inclusion of all advertisers as parties in inter-
est. The secondary competitor serves no more useful function, under this
analysis, than any other potential purchaser of broadcast time, and is avail-
able as protestant only in those cases where the applicant station owner has
a hand in other businesses than communications. Extension of the protest
right to all who advertise, however, seems clearly contrary to the legis-
lative intent. 7  It seems reasonable to assume, moreover, that such prac-
tices of a station as those mentioned will in fact be as well known to its
competitors as to its customers; and where such practices become so
egregious as to amount substantively to grounds for refusal of a license as
destructive of the public interest, there should be few cases where no
regards the problem of drawing the party in interest line as a case-by-case affair.
Id. at 658. Oberst has pointed out the "lost motion!' involved in this procedure.
Oberst, Parties to Administrative Proceedings, 40 MicH. L. Rxv. 378, 401-02 (1942).
55. NBC now owns six radio and seven television stations each of which must
be relicensed at three-year intervals. It is affiliated with 397 other stations. Celler,
Antitrust Problems in the Television Broadcasting Industry, 22 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PRoB. 549, 558-59 (1957).
56. If standing is limited to communications competitors, harassment is not likely.
Local newspapers and singly-owned stations would have standing as competitors with
only one or two of NBC's stations; larger communications units would have to fear
reprisals. Such secondary competitors as Philco, manufacturers of nationally adver-
tised commodities, could, however, with impunity pursue NBC from relicense to
relicense.
57. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
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primary competitor is available to offer the public interest argument in
all its dimensions. In any event, to permit a given class of parties who in
some cases may be useful for raising certain specific questions to intervene
in all cases and to raise all questions seems an unnecessary prodigality of
administrative time. Especially in view of the secondary competitors' op-
portunity to bring relevant information to Commission attention by other
means, it is suggested that the advantage of their full participation is slight
as against its cost. A better view would seem to dictate the restriction of
the party in interest right to those immediate communications competitors
embraced by the Sanders case itself.
CIVIL PROCEDURE-WHERn LooA. LAw FoRBIDs CLAss SuITs,
SuCH AcT0s1s Aim PREc RDED nT DrvERSITY CASES BY FEDRmLI
RULE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE 17(b)
The president and several members of a local union brought suit in
federal district court to enjoin enforcement of an order by the international
union suspending the local president, and to recover money damages from
the parent union. Jurisdiction was sought to be established on the ground
of diversity with the international president, Maloney, and another being
named defendants as representatives of the international.' On appeal the
court of appeals dismissed the action for lack of diversity. The court
reasoned that, since capacity to be sued in the federal courts is, under
Federal Rule 17(b),2 to be determined by state law and the applicable
state law3 forbids class suits against unincorporated associations, the class
1. Maloney and another were also sued in their individual capacities. This action
was dismissed by the circuit court on the ground that individually these defendants
could not afford plaintiffs the relief sought and that in a suit such as this, the inter-
national was an indispensable party.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) provides: "Capacity to Sue or be Sued. The capacity
of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued
shall be determined by the law of his domicile. The capacity of a corporation to sue
or be sued shall be determined by the law under which it was organized. it all other
cases capacity to use or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which
the district court is held, except (1) that a partnership or other unincorporated asso-
ciation, which has no such capacity by the law of such state, may sue or be sued in
its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right
existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States ... " (Emphasis
added.)
3. There is no controlling Pennsylvania state court authority on point. This
court based its decision on PA. R. Civ. P. 2153(a) which provides: "In an action
prosecuted against an association it shall be sufficient to name as defendant either
the association by its name, whether the same is registered, filed or not, or any officer
of the association as trustee ad litem for such association . . . ," and on a note of the
Procedural Rules Committee which revised the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
at the behest of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 3 GooDmra-AmRA, STANDARD
PENNSYLvANIA PRAcTicE § 2230 (1953), where it is stated: "Suits by or against
unincorporated associations are not to be brought as class suits under this Rule.
Such suits are now regulated by Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 2152 and 2153." (Rule No. 2152
relates to suits by unincorporated associations.)
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suit device permitted by rule 23 4 was inappropriate in this case. There-
fore, defendants' citizenship must be deemed that of the international, not
the two individual defendants, and the international's that of its members,
some of whom were citizens of the state in which plaintiffs resided. Under-
wood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 79 Sup. Ct. 93
(1958).5
The bulk of diversity cases 0 in the federal courts involves corporate
bodies as parties to the litigation. 7 To a large extent the suability of cor-
porations in the federal courts rests upon what has been termed "an ancient
and malignant error," 8 the irrebutable presumption used by the Supreme
Court that a suit by or against a corporation is a suit "by or against
the citizens of the state which created the corporate body; and that no
averment or evidence to the contrary is admissible. . .. " 9 This pre-
sumption of single citizenship of the membership has never been extended
to unincorporated associations,'0 and in diversity cases the citizenship of
all of the individual members of a party unincorporated association must be
diverse from that of the opposing parties." "The escape in such case[s]
has been, and must continue to be, the class action where only the citizen-
ship of the representatives need appear." '" This avenue of "escape" has
proven fruitful in diversity cases where the law of the forum state either
expressly provided for class actions against unincorporated associations by
statute 13 or does not expressly prohibit 14 them.
Rule 17(b) speaks only of "capacity to be sued," and in Pennsylvania
both the individual members 1 and the association as an entity'16 have
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) provides in part: "Representation. If persons consti-
tuting a class are so numerous as to make it impractical to bring them all before
the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation
of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued [under certain enumerated circumstances]."
5. On similar facts the same conclusion was reached in Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co. v. Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 149 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
6. "The judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend to [controversies]
between Citizens of different States . . . ." U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2.
7. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdictimr and the Rev4ion of the Judicial Code, 13
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 234-40, table at 243 (1948).
8. Id. at 237.
9. Ohio & Miss. R.R. v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286, 296 (1861).
10. Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889); Hetenbaugh v. Airline Pilots
Ass'n, 189 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1951).
11. Lowry v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 259 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1958),
and cases collected therein at nn.5, 6, 15.
12. 3 MooRE, FDmtAL PRAcricE 17.25, at 1412-13 (2d ed. 1948). For a history
of the device of class action in the federal courts see Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen, 148 F.2d 403, 404-05 (4th Cir. 1945).
13. Montgomery Ward v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948).
14. See Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 148 F.2d 403 (4th
Cir. 1945), which arose in Virginia, the law of which did not exclude class suits
against unincorporated associations.
15. See Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers, 380 Pa. 3, 109 A2d 815 (1954).
16. PA. R. Civ. P. 2153, quoted note 3 supra.
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the "capacity" to be sued for acts for which they are responsible or assent
to. The court here concedes the capacity of Maloney to be sued individually
under Pennsylvania law for acts to which he contributed yet holds that
he lacks the "capacity to be sued as class representative .. . , 17 It
would appear that the court here is applying rule 17(b) in a way that
borrows more than "capacity" from the state practice. Not only does the
court insist that state law permit the union to be sued, but the court requires
that the state permit the procedural device of the class action, in order that
17(b)'s "capacity" requirement be satisfied. It would appear that it should
be sufficient for diversity purposes that the real party in interest, here the
union, be amenable to suit in the state in question no matter what the
procedural device.
It would seem that the promulgators of rule 17(b) intended that the
rule would give litigants the benefit of state created capacity of the unin-
corporated associations to be sued as entities.' 8 A similar policy, that of
providing "a practical method whereby unincorporated labor organizations
may sue or be sued," underlies rule 23.19 It would further appear that no
obstacles were foreseen concerning "capacity" to the federal class suit
device in those states which allowed suit against unincorporated associations
as entities? ° Yet the instant court interpreted the word "capacity" to
restrict, rather than give, effect to the policy behind both rules. Moreover,
to reach its holding the court had to interpret Pennsylvania law as for-
bidding class actions. This interpretation is itself open to criticism.
21
There is even some opinion to the effect that 23 and 17(b) are alter-
native methods of bringing unincorporated associations into court.22  This
position would enable one to bring a class suit against an unincorporated
association in federal court on diversity grounds even in a state which
permits no suit of any kind to be brought against such organizations, and
therefore is subject to attack on the ground that it runs counter to the
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins theory that diversity should not cause a federal
and a state court considering the same case to reach different results.
24
In jurisdictions where unincorporated associations have been forbidden
access to the state courts as entities, this position has been properly re-
jected; and the associations have been denied use of the federal forum
where jurisdiction was sought to be founded on diversity.2- To permit
17. Instant case at 342.
18. Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1312-17
(1935).
19. 3 MooRE, FEDAuL PRAcricE 123.02, at 3410 (2d ed. 1948).
20. Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actios, 32 ILL. L. REv. 307, 315 (1937).
21. See note 4 supra.
22. 2 BARRON & HOLZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcriCE AND PROCEDURE 487, at 36-37
(1950). See also dicta in Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 148 F2d
403, 405 (4th Cir. 1945), and Lowry v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 259 F2d
568, 573 (5th Cir. 1958).
23. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24. 304 U.S. at 79. See also 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 619 (1957).
25. American Newspaper Guild v. Mackinnon, 108 F. Supp. 312 (D. Utah 1952);
Worthington Pump and Mach. Corp. v. Local 259, United Elec. Workers, 63 F.
Supp. 411 (D. Mass. 1945).
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the union to be sued by a class action in the principal case would not run
counter to the Erie policy, as the consequences of a class action in the
federal courts and a suit against the instant union in a state court would
appear to be the same.
However, the instant decision may be defended upon the ground that
it is a restriction of diversity jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction was an out-
growth of a feeling prevalent at the time of the promulgation of the Con-
stitution that impartiality could not be expected of the state courts when
dealing with controversies between citizens of different states.28 It was
Madison's belief that Congress would return to the state courts these cases
when "they find the tribunals of the states on good footing." 2 7 Federal
jurisdiction over diversity jurisdiction continues despite Madison's predic-
tion, but jurisdiction founded solely on diversity has fallen into grave dis-
repute with the weight of legal opinion on the subject.28  More than half
of the private civil litigation in the federal courts consists of diversity
cases,2 9 and often, as in the instant case,8 0 there is no state court authority
for points decided 1 It is possible that in cases of doubtful jurisdiction
the policy of disfavoring diversity jurisdiction may influence some federal
courts. Desirable as it may be for courts to limit diversity jurisdiction as
an overall policy, it would not seem desirable to curtail it in the instant
case. This piecemeal curtailment in a rule 23 case restricts diversity in a
situation where the purpose of the framers of the rule was to ease the path
of those attempting to use diversity.
CRIMINAL PROCEDUIRE-DISoRETIONARY PoWER OF TRIL
COURT To PERmIT PIR-TRmL INSPECTION Y ClRInlZz DEFENDANT
OF EVIDENCE IN POSSESSION OF PROSECUTION UPHELD
Criminal defendant was arrested for the murder of her husband ' and,
after a preliminary hearing, held without bail pending action by the grand
26. See Doub, Timw for Re-Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity Jurisdiction?,
44 A.B.A.J. 243 (1958).
27. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 522 (1928).
28. The authorities are collected in Doub, supra note 26. These authorities include,
inter alia, Justices Jackson, Harlan and Frankfurter.
29. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
37-38 (1955).
30. See note 3 supra.
31. JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 29, at 37.
1. The body of Max Kravitz was found by police on the afternoon of July 4,
1958. He had been shot twice in the back and severely beaten. The room in which
he was found was in considerable disarray and several panes of glass were broken.
The murder gun was found by police approximately three-quarters of a mile from
the house along the route allegedly taken by defendant en route to the home of her
brother-in-law on the afternoon of the slaying. The Evening Bulletin (Phila.),
July 5, 1958, p. 1, col. 8; id., July 6, 1958, p. 1, col. 8.
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jury.2  Shortly after her subsequent indictment for the murder, she peti-
tioned the criminal court of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, for pre-
trial examination and inspection of certain evidence in the possession of
the Commonwealth.3 The court, sitting en bane, ordered inspection of
certain of the requested items and denied access to others.4  The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in a per curiam opinion upon petition by the district
attorney for a writ of prohibition,5 amended the original order of the trial
court to deny inspection of one of the items,3 but refused the writ of pro-
hibition.7 Diloseph Petition, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958).
The general common-law rule since the English decision in Rex v.
Holland 8 in 1792 has been that a defendant in a criminal case has no right
to discovery or examination of evidence in the possession of the prosecu-
tion prior to trial. The modern trend, however, has been to allow limited
discovery as a matter within the discretion of the trial court." Prior to the
adoption in 1946 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, federal courts
were divided on the issue of pre-trial discovery 10 and the limits, 1 if any,
2. The defense counsel then filed a writ of habeas corpus which was dismissed
by the trial court. On appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. Brief for
Petitioner, pp. 2-3.
3. The petition stated that the district attorney had referred in the earlier hearings
to the articles specified and had denied the defense opportunity for examination and
inspection. It requested: (1) inspection of the house for two days without police
supervision; (2) opportunity to examine certain articles of clothing, furniture, and
rugs; (3) a copy of the list that had been made by police of articles removed and
persons permitted on the premises; (4) defendant's mail; (5) reports and photo-
graphs of fingerprints, if any, found on the alleged murder weapon, and production
of the revolver for defense examination; (6) pieces of broken glass from the garage;
(7) photographs of the interior and exterior of the house, taken by the police when
they arrived at the scene of the crime; and (8) a transcript of the tape-recorded
interrogation of defendant by the police immediately following her arrest.
4. The court ordered the district attorney to comply with all the defense requests
except production of expert reports concerning fingerprints and ballistics and the
transcript of the tape-recorded interrogation. Order dated Sept. 24, 1958, Common-
wealth v. Kravitz, No. 245, Pa. Montgomery County Ct. The trial court later filed
a supplementary opinion to this opinion and order, justifying its use of discretion.
5. The attorney general in his brief and argument as anicus curiae contended
that a writ of prohibition was improper in the instant case. The question of what
remedy, if any, is available to the prosecution for an adverse trial court order is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
6. The supreme court modified the lower court order by removing from the grant
of discovery photographs of fingerprints, if any, found on the gun.
7. Two members of the court joined the per curium opinion, two wrote con-
curring opinions, and one dissented.
8. 4 T.RI 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792) ("the rule for inspection [of
documents] is confined to civil cases").
9. See, e.g., State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A2d 647 (1946) ; State v. Cicenia,
6 N.J. 296, 78 A2d 568, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 925 (1955). For a survey of all juris-
dictions see Dowling, Pre-Trial Inspectiom of Prosecution's Evidence by Defendant,
53 Diex. L. REv. 301 (1949).
10. United States v. Rich, 6 Alaska 670 (1922) (inspection of broken glass
allowed). But see United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nora. Nachman v. United States, 286 U.S. 556 (1932) (doubtful if any discovery
in criminal cases without statutory authority).
11. See United States v. Goldman, 316 U.S. 129 (1941); Edwards v. United
States, 312 U.S. 473 (1941). See also Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal
Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. Rxv. 221, 238-40 (1957).
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of its application. Rule 16,12 providing for discovery as a matter of dis-
cretion in particular circumstances, embodies the more liberal line of deci-
sions.13 In addition, rule 17(c) 14 places the subpoena power at the de-
fendant's disposal, and to some extent facilitates discovery. The prevailing
view, however, is that this rule was not designed as a discovery provision
but rather as a means of reaching "potential" evidence for use at trial.35
In the state courts, some discovery has been established by the majority of
jurisdictions either by judicial decision,16 promulgation of state court
rules, 17 or expressly by statute.'3 The extent to which due process requires
discovery is unclear. The courts which have dealt with discovery problems
have largely by-passed the constitutional issue, instead placing their deci-
sions on policy considerations.) 9 The United States Supreme Court has
denied certiorari where discovery was refused in Louisiana,
20 New Jersey,2 1
Texas, and Washington.23  In Leland v. Oregon24 the Court briefly re-
jected appellant's contention that in the particular case the due process
12 FED. R. Cm. P. 16 provides: "Upon motion of a defendant at any time after
the filing of the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the
government to permit defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books,
papers, documents, or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant
or obtained from others by seizure or process, upon a showing that the items sought
may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable.
The order shall specify the time, place, and manner of making the inspection and of
taking copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms which are just."
13. See comment to FED. R. CRam. P. 16.
14. FED. R. Cam!. P. 17(c) provides: "A subpoena may also command the person
to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents, or other objects
designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct
the books, papers, documents, or objects designated in the subpoena to be produced
before the court at a time prior to trial or prior to the time when they are offered
in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents, or
objects, or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys."
15. See Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951); United States
v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953). See also Orfield, supra note 11.
16. E.g., Commonwealth v. Bantolini, 299 Mass. 503, 13 N.E.2d 825 (1948);
State ex rel. Wagner v. Circuit Court, 60 S.D. 115, 244 N.W. 100 (1932). Juris-
dictions are compiled as of 1949 in Dowling, supra note 9.
17. N.J. CRam. P.R. 3-510, 3-511.
18. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 909.18 (1941) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1530 (Supp.
1957).
19. See Dowling, supra note 9; Orfield, supra note 11.
20. State v. Martinez, 220 La. 899, 57 So. 888, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 846 (1952).
In State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 373 (1948), the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that a defendant had a right to inspect his confession. Subsequent holdings in
State v. Shroud, 224 La. 955, 71 So. 2d 340 (1954), and State v. Haddad, 221 La.
337, 59 So. 2d 888 (1952), severely restricted discovery.
21. State v. Cicenia, 6 N.J. 296, 78 A.2d 568, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 925 (1955).
22. Lopez v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 16, 252 S.W2d 701, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
893 (1952).
23. State v. Clark, 21 Wash. 2d 774, 153 P.2d 297, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 878
(1945).
24. 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 795, aff'd, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
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clause of the fourteenth amendment required pre-trial discovery. Although
the Third Circuit has indicated by way of dictum that there might be cases
where due process requires discovery, 5 apparently neither the Supreme
Court nor the courts of appeals have as yet been presented with such a case.
In Pennsylvania prior to 1952 county court rulings had denied pre-
trial inspection of confessions, other documentary material, and tangible
evidence.26  In that year the supreme court was first presented with the
issue in Commonwealth v. Hoban 2 7 when the District Attorney of Lacka-
wanna County sought a writ of prohibition against the action of the county
court in allowing discovery of a written confession in a murder case. The
court, in a short per curiam opinion, affirmed the discretionary power of
the trial judge to allow discovery "if justice so required," 28 but specifically
restricted its holding to written confessions. Six lower court cases de-
cided after the Hoban case all denied discovery without mention of that
decision.29 In two of these 30 reliance was placed on the statement adopted
from Wharton by Chief Justice Stern in Commonwealth v. Wable 31 that
"defendant had no right to examine before trial evidence in the possession
of the prosecution." 3 2 In that case defendant, after the impanelling of the
jury, petitioned the court to order the district attorney to permit inspection
of the alleged murder gun. Defendant's expert was subsequently given an
opportunity to examine the gun at counsel table but was never called as a
witness. On appeal of the conviction this and the fact that defendant was
25. Application of Tune, 230 F2d 883 (3d Cir. 1956). This decision was favorably
noted in the recent case of Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 511 (1958). The Supreme
Court, however, affirmed its earlier holding in Leland that a discretionary refusal of
a trial judge to permit inspection did not offend due process. .
26. Commonwealth v. Sherman, 72 Pa. D. & C. 367 (Montgomery County Ct.
1950) (written confession, subsequent statements); Commonwealth v. Smith, 67 Pa.
D. & C. 598 (Dauphin County Ct. 1949) (defendant's written confession, autopsy
report, dying declaration) ; Commonwealth v. McQuiston, 56 Pa. D. & C. 533 (Mont-
gomery County Ct. 1946) (copy of defendant's signed statement).
27. 54 Lackawauna Jurist 213 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1952), affirming Commonwealth v.
Stepper, 54 Lackawanna Jurist 205 (Pa. Lackawanna County Ct. 1952). This decision
was never reported in the official state reports. The defendant originally asked for
inspection of a hunting knife and a shotgun. The district attorney did not contest
inspection of this evidence, and thus neither the lower court nor the supreme court
was called upon to rule on anything other than the confession.
28. Commonwealth v. Stepper, supra note 27, at 211.
29. Commonwealth v. Adams, 6 Lebanon County L.J. 177 (Pa. Lebanon County
Ct. 1956) (gun); Commonwealth v. Randejko, 48 Berks County L.J. 34 (Pa. Berks
County Ct. 1955) (motion too general); Commonwealth v. Graham, 42 Delaware
County R. 313 (Pa. Delaware County Ct. 1955) (murder weapon and statements) ;
Commonwealth v. Allen, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 472 (Washington County Ct. 1955) (pre-
scriptions); Commonwealth v. Zayac, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 646 (Montgomery County Ct.
1954) (gun); Commonwealth v. Smutko, 14 Beaver County L.J. 254 (Pa. Beaver
County Ct. 1953).
30. Commonwealth v. Randejko, supra note 29; Commonwealth v. Graham, supra
note 29.
31. 382 Pa. 80, 114 A.2d 334 (1955).
32. 382 Pa. at 86, 114 A.2d at 338. In the instant case, both the defense and the
attorney general conceded that this quotation represented the holding of Wable.
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denied the right to inspect psychiatric reports concerning his sanity were
contended to be error. The court found no merit to the contention that the
ballistics expert did not have ample time to examine the gun and held that
there was no prejudice to defendant in denying him the psychiatric reports
since sanity was not in issue at the trial. Thus, reliance on this decision
for the proposition that pre-trial discovery is never permissible seems un-
justified, particularly in view of the court's decision in Hoban.
At the minimum, the instant decision stands for the proposition that,
in a criminal case, pre-trial discovery of real evidence as well as confessions
can sometimes be permitted by the trial courts, and thus overrules the line
of lower court decisions holding that in the absence of statutory authority
no basis for discretionary discovery exists. The supreme court opinion
does not give an indication of whether discovery was permitted in order
to comply with the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment,
or merely as a matter of state procedural policy. A close reading of the
lower court opinion, however, indicates that that court did not consider
discovery per se a constitutional right. The court's first order, admittedly
drawn in haste in order not to delay the trial, merely directed the district
attorney to permit inspection of certain items, giving brief reasons, without
citation of authority, for reaching the result.P No mention was made of
due process as a ground for the decision. In the supplementary opinion,
filed after the application for the writ of prohibition, the court injected the
issue of due process by concluding:
"[TIhe Commonwealth has impeded and hampered defense counsel's
investigation and preparation for trial by unrestrained and arbitrary
authority without fair cooperation and is therefore depriving the ac-
cused of that due process of law commanded by the 14th amendment
to the Constitution of the United States." 34
If by this statement the court meant that discovery per se is a constitutional
right, there is little authority for this view.P The balance of the opinion,
however, indicates that the court was primarily concerned with its dis-
cretionary power to grant discovery and the reasons for exercising that
discretion in the instant case. Viewed in this light, the reference to due
process appears more an afterthought, or a reason for exercising discre-
tion, than a statement of constitutional compulsion. In short, "fairness"
justified the exercise of discretion, rather than demanded it.
The basic argument advanced for discovery is that it frequently is
necessary in order to give defendant a fair and adequate opportunity to
33. Order and Opinion dated Sept. 24, 1958, Commonwealth v. Kravitz, No. 245,
Pa. Montgomery County Ct.
34. Supplementary Opinion to the Order and Opinion dated Sept. 24, 1958, Com-
monwealth v. Kravitz, No. 245, Pa. Montgomery County Ct., p. 7.
35. See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra.
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prepare his case.3 6 Moreover, by reducing the need for continuance, trial
time and expense are reduced; orderly and expeditious conduct of the trial
is promoted. 7 Opponents of discovery, on the other hand, have argued
that it will lead to an increase in perjury, fabricated evidence, false alibis,
and unwarranted harassment of the prosecution 3 s Lack of mutuality 3 9
and the adequacy of existing constitutional protections 40 are additional
objections. While the arguments against discovery may have some merit in
an occasional case, they fall far short of justifying absolute denial. The
proposition that merely because the police reach the scene of the crime first
they are at liberty to conduct all necessary tests, examinations, and experi-
ments, and then remove all relevant tangible evidence and impound it until
trial, thus denying to the defense even the opportunity of reconstructing the
setting of the action, is untenable.
The proposal that discovery be unlimited in scope, however, has had
little formal support. Recent developments in New Jersey criminal pro-
cedure 41 indicate that that jurisdiction permits an advanced measure of
discovery. Consideration of the "open file" system as practiced in Phila-
delphia county, which system amounts to virtually unlimited discovery, was
urged in argument in the instant case by the attorney general as amicus
curiae.4 The objections to this approach center around the removal of trial
judge discretion and the injustice this might work in many cases. Names
of informers may not be sufficiently protected. In cases involving racket
or "gang" killings witnesses might be intimidated or silenced. Disclosure
of the precise details of the prosecution's case will facilitate fabrication of
false evidence and remove the threat of surprise from the phony alibi.
Despite availability of information from other sources, defense counsel
might abuse the privilege and unduly harass the prosecutor.
In rejecting the contention that turning over of the evidence in the
hands of the prosecution will place an impossible burden on the state, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has now struck the balance in favor of
limited discovery. It has at least tacitly approved a procedure which bal-
ances in the individual case the importance to the defendant against the
36. See State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647 (1946) ; State v. Cicenia, 6 N.J.
296, 78 A.2d 568. cert. denied, 350 U.S. 925 (1955); Commonwealth v. Hoban, 54
Lackawanna Jurist 213 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1952). See also Dowling, supra note 9.
37. See Commonwealth v. Hoban, supra note 36; State ex rel. Wagner v. Circuit
Court, 60 S.D. 115, 244 N.W. 100 (1932). See also Orfield, supra note 11.
38. See State v. Shroud, 224 La. 928, 71 So. 2d 340 (1954) ; State ex rel. Lemon v.
Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927); instant case at 28, 145 A.2d at
190 (dissenting opinion); Commonwealth v. Hoban, 54 Lackawanna Jurist 213, 220
(Pa. Sup. Ct. 1952) ; cf. cases collected in Annot., 52 A.L.R. 207 (1928).
39. State v. Hall, 55 Mont. 182, 175 Pac. 267 (1918).
40. May v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 2, 83 S.W.2d 338 (1935).
41. See N.J. CRnm. P.. 3-510, 3-511; cf. State v. Johnson, 145 A.2d 313 (N.J.
1958).
42. Brief of Attorney General as Amicus Curiae, p. 11.
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prejudice to the state. A problem that remains, however, is whether there
are particular categories of evidence which, because of the nature of the
evidence included therein, should be placed beyond the exercise of this
discretion. Some jurisdictions, by adopting the test of "admissibility at
trial," exclude all information or evidence, no matter how necessary for a
satisfactory preparation, unless it meets the legal qualifications for intro-
duction at trial.43 Other states have drawn their -statutes or rules to
exclude such items as confessions, 44 expert reports,5 or statements of wit-
nesses. 46 Federal Rule 16 exempts from discovery evidence obtained from
third parties which was not seized or procured by process. 47 In the instant
case, the lower court expressed the view that granting of expert ballistic or
fingerprint analysis, as opposed to photographs of the markings on the
gun, was beyond their discretionary power." This inclination to categorize
by subject matter bars flexibility and would appear to work hardship in
certain cases. While in the present case the defense apparently was in a
position to conduct its own tests, there are circumstances when an expert
report may be vital to the defense case and because of the time or cost
factor impossible to duplicate. For example, sanity of a defendant imme-
diately following the crime may be a key factor in a given case. The con-
dition of a body or a medical report may contain information that cannot
be duplicated after the passage of several days or a week. Furthermore,
the many defendants who lack resources 49 may be precluded from carrying
through their investigations, even if they are able to procure the objects or
persons to be tested. The basis for the exclusion of expert reports seems
to be the thought that it is somehow inequitable to give to defendant the
benefit of prosecution expenditures of money and effort without giving a
similar benefit to the prosecution. °  While emphasis on the adversary
character of civil litigation may be justified to some extent, the concept of
43. New York follows this rule. People v. Preston, 176 N.Y.S2d 542 (Kings
County Ct. 1958) ; People v. Jordan, 128 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1953) ; People
v. Skoyec, 183 Misc. 764, 50 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. 1944). See also Dowling, supra
note 9.
44. E.g., Williams v. State, 143 Fla. 826, 197 So. 562 (1940) (confession not
tangible evidence under statute).
45. E.g., IDAnO CODE ANN. § 19-1530 (Supp. 1957).
46. E.g., ibid. Statements of witnesses are excluded from the language of rules
patterned on FED. R. Cwm. P. 16.
47. See note 12 supra. For a criticism of the restricted, scope of rule 16, see 60
YALE L.J. 626 (1951).
48. Order and Opinion dated Sept. 24, 1958, Commonwealth v. Kravitz, No. 245,
Pa. Montgomery County Ct, p. 3. See Certified Transcript of the Argument on
Defendant's Petition in the Trial Court, Sept 19, 1958, Commonwealth v. Kravitz,
No. 245, Pa. Montgomery County Ct, pp. 33-36.
49. It has been estimated that 60% of all criminal defendants are poor or indigent.
BROWNELL, LEGAL Am rn THE UxNiTm STATEs 86 (1951).
50. State v. Hall, 55 Mont. 182, 175 Pac. 267 (1918).
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trial as a "contest" has no place in a criminal prosecution. 51 The re-
sources of the state are vastly superior to those of private litigants. More-
over, the prosecution is under a duty not only to convict the guilty, but to
protect the innocent as well.52  In an individual case, refusal of discovery
of expert reports may be less objectionable where the defense has an oppor-
tunity to conduct the required tests and can afford to pursue this investiga-
tion, particularly if the need for the report seems slight. Removing expert
reports from the reach of the defense in all cases, however, is unjustified.
The trial court granted all the defense requests with the exception of
the transcript of the tape recording of defendant's interrogation by the
police. 8 Defense counsel urged that a copy of the transcript was necessary
in order properly to prepare for cross-examination at trial.5 4  The court
in rejecting the request stated:
"At this time, we have no way of knowing whether the tape re-
cording or its transcription will even be offered in evidence, and since
defendant herself answered the questions and denied her guilt, she is in
a position to know and advise her counsel what she said." "
From the language used, it would seem that the court viewed the transcript
as being an item for which discovery could be granted but that under the
circumstances discovery was not warranted. Scant attention was paid to
counsel's point concerning cross-examination. In the opinion of many
writers,56 searching cross-examination requires time for careful preparation,
and if counsel is not provided with information until just prior to its intro-
duction or the offer of testimony by the interrogator, adequate time is
lacking for the necessary preparation. Although in the instant case it must
be conceded that the defense was not prejudiced by this denial, the better
practice would be to grant the request, particularly when the cost or
prejudice to the state is slight.
The supreme court's only modification of the order of the trial court
was to exclude photographs of fingerprints from the list of items granted.
57
It is difficult to ascertain whether the justices viewed fingerprints as belong-
51. See State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647 (1946) ; Commonwealth v. Hoban,
54 Lackawanna Jurist 213 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1952).
52. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 5 (1957). In Pennsylvania
these canons are given the force of law. PA. R. Crv. P. 205.
53. Order and Opinion dated Sept. 24, 1958, Commonvealth v. Kravitz, No. 245,
Pa. Montgomery County Ct, pp. 3-4.
54. Certified Transcript of the Argument on Defendant's Petition in the Trial
Court, Sept. 19, 1958, Commonwealth v. Kravitz, No. 245, Pa. Montgomery County
Ct., pp. 18-21.
55. Order and Opinion dated Sept. 24, 1958, Commonwealth v. Kravitz, No. 245,
Pa. Montgomery County Ct, pp. 3-4.
'56. E.g., 5 WiGmoRE, EvIDENcE §§ 1367-94 (3d ed. 1940).
57. Instant case at 21, 145 A.2d at 187.
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ing to a category of evidence totally beyond the reach of discovery or rather
as evidence which in this particular case was improperly granted. The
only expressed reason for the refusal is found in Justice Musmanno's con-
curring opinion which seems indicative of the latter ground. In the justice's
view defendant "is one person who knows whether she used the weapon or
not and, therefore, she is not being denied anything which she needs in the
ascertainment of truth." 5 8 This reasoning ignores the possibility that the
gun might have belonged to the deceased and had been handled by defend-
ant for any number of reasons in the course of housekeeping, in which event
the defendant might not know or remember whether her prints were on
the alleged murder weapon. A more probable reason for the court's action
was that the defense request was a "fishing expedition." 5 9 Whatever the
reason, no other means were available from which the defense could elicit
whether there were fingerprints or not. The state's entire case was based
on circumstantial evidence and the existence or nonexistence of prints was
a crucial issue for a defense based on a "third party." Had defendant's
prints been found on the gun, the trial would undoubtedly have been
delayed while the defense experts conducted their examination. It is hard
to ascertain how preparation or presentation of the prosecution's case could
have been seriously hindered by the requirement of affording the defense
an opportunity to view photographs of markings, if any, on the gun. The
court's modification of the trial court order thus seems unwarranted.
The present case clarifies the Pennsylvania position on discovery,
bringing it to the minimal level generally accepted in the United States.
Neither court, however, articulated a test by which discoverability of
individual items is to be granted. Similarly, the pattern of grant and denial
is not very helpful in fixing the limits of permissible discovery or in
formulating a test for making individual determinations. In placing dis-
covery within the discretion of the trial court, the decision seems likely to
engender a succession of confused, inconsistent results. Many courts will
undoubtedly grant discovery only upon a showing of great need on the part
of the defense. Since in many cases, at least, it is difficult to find a legitimate
reason for denying discovery, it is to .be hoped that the entire question will
be re-examined with a view to the desirability of granting discovery as a
matter of right, possibly excepting cases where the prosecution can show
the likelihood of substantial harm resulting from the proposed grant. In
this connection, the suggestion 60 of the attorney general that the question
be examined by the Procedural Rules Committee of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court is worthy of serious consideration.
58. Id. at 25, 145 A.2d at 190.
59. Defendant had alleged that the prosecution had referred in testimony at
earlier hearings to the question of fingerprints. In reality, no such reference was made.
The defense request was for "fingerprints, if any." Hence, the request was not for
a specific ascertained item. Interview With William O'Hey, Jr., Chief Defense
Counsel, at Norristown, Pa., Nov. 19, 1958.
60. Brief of the Attorney General as Amicus Curiae, pp. 22-23.
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INSURANCE-BREAcH OF OBLIGATION To DEFEND BY INSURANCE
ComPAw'Y DoEs NOT RELIEVE IlSUlER OF DUTY To SETTLE CLAim
IN GOOD FArH
Insured entered into a standard automobile liability insurance contract
with defendant insurance company with limits of $10,000 per person and
$20,000 per accident. Claiming that plaintiff was struck by a truck which
was not within the policy coverage, defendant refused to represent insured
in an action brought by plaintiff. Therefore, insured defended the action
with his own attorney. On the second day of trial, the attorney advised
the insurance company that the claim could be settled for $4,000; that
insured did not have the money to settle himself; and that, if the action
went to judgment, the jury would probably return a verdict in excess of
policy limits. Insurer again refused to assume the defense or to consider
the offer of settlement, and a judgment for $25,000 followed. In a suit
brought by plaintiff against the company,' it was determined that the policy
covered insured and defendant paid the policy limits. Plaintiff then ob-
tained an assignment of insured's remaining rights against the company
and sued it for the unpaid portion of the judgment in excess of the limits.
The California Supreme Court held that the insurance company, by re-
pudiating its express obligation to defend, was not relieved of its implied
obligation to consider in good faith offers of compromise, and was liable
for the entire judgment.2 Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d
198 (Cal. 1958).
When the complaint in an action against the insured alleges facts
within the coverage of the policy, the extent of the insurer's duty to defend
is determined from the express language 3 of the contract.4 The policy also
normally gives exclusive control of .the defense to the insurer 5 Complica-
tions arise for the insurer who feels that, because of a breach of policy
1. Such an action is permitted by CAL. INS. CoDE § 11580(b) (2).
2. The court also held that the action was one in contract subject to the statute
of limitations for that type of suit and that insured's rights were assignable. These
issues will not be discussed herein.
3. Paragraph II of the policy provided: "Defense, Settlement, Supplementary
Payments[.] As respects such insurance as is afforded by the other terms of this
policy (a) under coverages A and B the company shall 1. defend in his name and behalf
any suit against the insured alleging such injury or destruction and seeking damages
on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent, but the company
shall have the right to make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any
claim or suit as may be deemed expedient by the company; 2.. .. The company
agrees to pay the amounts incurred under this insuring agreement, except settlement
of claims and suits, in addition to the applicable limit of liability of this policy."
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, p. 19.
4. See cases collected SA Am. Ju- Automobile Insuraiwe § 119 (1936) ; 8 ArPL-
MAN, INsURANcE LAW & PRAcricE §4684 (1942, Supp. 1958). For cases suggesting
that the duty to defend may exist even though a policy provision operates to avoid
coverage, see id. at 13.
5. 8 APPLEmAN, op. cit. su ra note 4, §4681, at 1. For applicable provision in
the instant policy see note 3 supra.
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provision by the insured, it is relieved of its duty to defend, or that, because
of lack of coverage, the duty never arose. Since the company may fear
that it has misevaluated its liability under the policy, it often seeks neverthe-
less to exercise exclusive control over the defense. However, such an
assumption of -the defense has been held to estop the company from there-
after denying its liability.6 To solve this dilemma the company may first
seek a declaratory judgment that it is not liable 7 or, by a letter of reserva-
tion or a nonwaiver agreement with the insured, seek to defend without
prejudice to its right to disclaim." Neither solution is always satisfactory.
The declaratory judgment may not be available; 9 and the insured, being
under no obligation to assent to a defense under reservation, may force the
insurer to elect.10 When the insurer is found to be in breach of contract
for its refusal to defend, the measure of damages has been held to include:
the amount of the judgment or reasonable settlement on the injured's claim
up to the policy limits; 1 the reasonable expenses incurred by the insured in
conducting the defense; 12 and compensation for additional damages proved
by the insured to be the proximate result of insurer's breach,13 such as
loss due to a sheriff's sale of insured's truck and trailer to satisfy a judgment
against insured 1 4 or loss during the period in which insured's equipment
was attached.' 5 Although some courts suggest a different result where it is
demonstrated that the insurer's breach is in bad faith,'6 a showing by the
insured merely that the company wrongfully refused to defend and that a
judgment in excess of policy limits was rendered, does not make the insurer
liable for that portion of the judgment in excess of the imitsY7
6. 8 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, § 4692 and authorities cited therein.
7. 8 id. § 4686, at 23.
8. 8 id. § 4694.
9. See, e.g., Columbia Cas. Co. v. Zimmerman, 62 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1952) ; Eureka
Cas. Co. v. Henderson, 371 Pa. 587, 92 A.2d 551 (1952). For discussions of the
problems confronting insurers when they pursue this remedy and suggested modifi-
cations of existing law see Knight, Declaratory Judgment in the Field of Casualty
Insurance, 22 INs. CouxsE. J. 152 (1956); Insurance Dilemma.: Defending Actions
Against Insured, 2 STAN. L. Rzv. 383 (1950).
10. See generally 8 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, §4686; 49 A-L.R.2d 694,
700 (1956).
11. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Gault, 196 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1952) ; see 49 A.L.R.2d
694, 717-21 (1956).
12. Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Cas. & Sur. Co., 149 Minn. 482, 184 N.W. 189
(1921) ; see 49 A.L.R.2d 694, 721-36 (1956).
13. See 49 A.L.R2d 694, 737 (1956) ; cases cited notes 14, 15 infra.
14. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 181
Md. 295, 29 A.2d 653 (1942).
15. Henkel v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 301, 295 P.2d 80
(Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
16. Ibid. See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Skaggs, 251 F.2d 356 (10th
Cir. 1957).
.-17. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Gault, 196 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1952).
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Earlier holdings suggested that the company had an unlimited discre-
tion whether to settle,' but the trend of judicial thought is sharply away
from this. The courts have read into the policy an obligation of the com-
pany to consider offers of settlement in "good faith," according to the
majority rule, or with "due care," according to the minority.' 9 The
rationale for this implied obligation
"is that the company has exclusive control over the decisions concern-
ing settlement within policy coverage and company and insured often
have conflicting interests as to whether settlement should be made;
the view which has been accepted is that company's power to affect
the interests of the parties as well as its own interests should be ac-
companied by responsibility for its exercise, regardless of the fact
that such responsibility is not expressed in the policy." 2
0
Where, after assuming the defense, the insurer breaches the imposed stand-
ard in considering offers of settlement, it has been held that the insurer
is liable for a resulting judgment, even if in excess of policy limits.2 '
Only one case has dealt with the question of whether breach of the obliga-
tion to defend relieves insurer of his obligation to settle in good faith.22  In
State Farm Mitt. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Skaggs 2 the court had before it the
same problem presented in the instant case and held that the insurer was
not liable in excess of the policy limits2 4 because, by not assuming the
defense, it did not incur the implied obligation to settle2 5
The rationale of the instant decision assumes that the obligation to
settle arises when the company agrees to defend. Because the duty to settle
has been created to keep the interests of the insured from being ignored,
18. E.g., Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 AtI.
503 (1899).
19. For detailed discussion of these rules see 8 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 4,
§§4711-15; VANCE, INSUANC= §196, at 1005 (3d ed. 1951); 40 A.L.R2d 168
(1955); Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responibility for Settlenwit, 67 H~av. L.
REv. 1136 (1954).
20. Keeton, supra note 19, at 1138. See also Home Indem. Co. v. Williamson,
183 F2d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Epstein v. Erie Indem. Co., 39 Pa. D. & C. 117
(C.P.), aff'd, 340 Pa. 417 (1940); Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity. & Deposit Co.,
162 Wis. 39, 53, 155 N.W. 1081, 1087 (1916).
21. E.g., Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817 (1938) ;
Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., supra note 20.
22. See also American Cas. Co. v. Glorfield, 216 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1954);
Strode v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Ky. 1952), aff'd, 202
F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1953), for cases dealing with the problem of insurers! duty to
communicate offers of settlement to insured when it withdraws from defense.
23. 251 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1957).
24. One distinguishing fact from the case at bar is that, in Skaggs, there was
no express statement by insured that he could not pay the settlement.
25. The court expressly reserved the question of damages caused by a bad faith
refusal by insurer to defend. 251 F.2d at 360. a
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previous cases suggest that this obligation arises only when the insurer
actually assumes the exclusive control of the defense.2 6 Conceding that the
court doctrinally could properly have taken a restrictive view of this duty,
the principal case nevertheless is based upon sound policy. Just as the
original extensions of the duty to settle resulted from a desire of the courts
to protect an insured with little ability to protect his own interests when
the insurer had complete control of the defense,27 this decision recognizes
that even relinquishment of exclusive control of the defense by the insurer
to the insured may not afford the insured adequate protection. Given the
opportunity to make a reasonable settlement quickly, the insured, as in the
instant case, may find it impossible to raise sufficient money, which the
company can easily produce. Thus, the result of insurer's breach of con-
tract may be a large judgment.
The Skaggs case suggested a distinction based on whether insurer's
failure to defend is in good or bad faith.28 It is submitted that the instant
court was correct in rejecting this distinction. Excess liability awards
should be for the purpose of compensating the insured for his actual
damage caused by the breach and not for punishing an insurer. Two
parties who suffer equal damages resulting from breaches of contracts by
their respective insurance companies are equally deserving of full com-
pensation, regardless of whether one of the companies acted in bad faith.
Moreover, since settlement negotiations between the company and the
injured party occur so frequently under modern practice, a lost opportunity
to have insured's claim settled may be classified as a foreseeable damage
falling reasonably within the normal measure of damage from breach of
contract,2 9 without any necessity of relying on bad faith.
The rule of the instant court will result in an increased risk of excess
liability for insurers. However, this risk may be reduced if insurance
companies take reasonable steps, in advance of insured's trial, to either
have their liability judicially determined, or to defend with reservation of
their rights to disclaim. The company in the instant case did not seek
either of these remedies. Even when excess judgments do not result, the
liability insurance system does not work well when the insured controls
the defense, since the insurer is in a position to keep legal expenses at a
minimum and normally strives for more economical settlements than an
insured who may only be concerned with bringing the litigation to an end.30
Thus, a wrongful disclaimer without first pursuing these other remedies is
unnecessarily wasteful. As discussed previously, these remedies will not
26. See note 19 supra.
27. See notes 19, 20 supra.
28. 251 F.2d at 360.
29. RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 330 (1932).
30. Cf. Keeton, mtpra note 19, at 1166.
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completely solve the insurer's problems in this area; 3 1 but these methods,
particularly the obtaining of declaratory judgments, have more potential
than is now being exploited.P Judicial and legislative liberalization of the
declaratory judgment field 3 will further aid the insurer; but, regardless
of such reform, it is clear that the most desirable course of action is for
the insurer to at least attempt to secure such a judgment conclusively dis-
posing of its liability before it surrenders the privilege of exclusive control
of the defense.
31. See text accompanying notes 9, 10 opra.
32. See Knight, supra note 9.
33. See note 9 supra.
